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Enacting Social Justice Ethically:  
Individual and Communal Habits
Michael G. Gunzenhauser
Abstract
In response to Hytten’s provocative opening of a conversation about an ethics for activist teaching, in 
this essay I address three interesting contributions that Hytten made. First, I explore the significance 
of the imagined ethical subject in Hytten’s example and in many prior authors’ work on ethics in social 
justice teaching. Expanding the imagined ethical subject (beyond the resistant student with limited 
experience of difference), which Hytten began to do, is fruitful for additional contexts. Second, I 
attend to the philosophical basis upon which Hytten rested her ethical theory and suggest some ways 
that philosophers might follow her critical and pragmatist sensibilities and avoid the meta- ethical 
limitations of more traditional ethical theory. Third, the essay ends with considerations of potentially 
a more social ethics, and toward that end, I propose two communal habits implied in Hytten’s work— 
cultivating solidarity and comfort with discomfort— that might complement the four habits Hytten 
named in her ethics.
This article is in response to
Hytten, K. Ethics in Teaching for Democracy and Social Justice. Democracy & Education 23(2).  
Article 1. Available from http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol23/iss2/1
In her essay, Hytten (2015) invites a conversation about ethics in social justice teaching practices. Hytten names several problems with social justice teaching practice and is 
especially concerned with the ways social justice teaching may 
contradict its purported aims to promote pluralistic engagement 
and deep democracy. When educators describe ethical justifica-
tions for their teaching practice, they may conflate ethics and moral 
commitments with social justice work. This is an important 
philosophical distinction, and while we need not separate them 
entirely (as Campbell [2008, 2013] has suggested), we need to 
articulate a relation between them. As Hytten argues, conflating 
ethics and social justice commitments can lead to self- righteous 
justification for nonreflective teaching practices and unwarranted 
violence against the very students social justice educators wish to 
prepare to be social justice advocates.
Absent from much of the discourse on social justice pedagogy 
is engagement with the discourse on the ethics of teaching, and 
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only on rare occasions has the discourse on teaching ethics 
addressed social justice teaching. In some cases, Hytten (2015) 
finds rather strong arguments against the possibility of reconcilia-
tion. Hytten is undaunted by these challenges. After synthesizing 
these discourses, she names an ethical vision for social justice 
teaching. She then names virtues and habits that may help establish 
an engaged ethics for activist teaching. Drawing from critical and 
pragmatist sensibilities, Hytten argues for three habits: reflective 
humility, intellectual open- mindedness, and sympathetic atten-
tiveness. She provocatively begins what should be a vital conversa-
tion, especially in schools of education but also throughout the 
education sector.
In this essay response, I take up the provocative invitation  
and focus on schools of education as specific sites for social justice 
teaching. I highlight some explicit and implicit philosophical 
moves in Hytten’s (2015) essay, and I consider the implications of 
the vision and advocacy role that she proposes for social justice 
teaching and how it relates to educational goals. While acknowl-
edging some constraints related to the critical and pragmatist 
approaches Hytten takes, I offer additional communal habits— 
namely cultivating classrooms of solidarity and a comfort with 
discomfort— that are embedded in her analysis and may comple-
ment the habits she has already proposed. I propose these habits to 
further enact the communal goals of social justice teaching.
When It Comes to the Ethics  
of Teaching, Context Matters
In education discourse, we are apparently especially concerned 
with preservice public school teachers, because much of the 
discourse about social justice pedagogy focuses on this population 
of students, who might then adopt or adapt social justice pedagogy 
for their own classrooms. While Hytten (2015) does not explicitly 
contain her discussion to teacher educators, she seems most 
interested in teachers of students in teacher preparation and other 
early professional programs. The student implied by much of her 
discussion is the one with limited experience and without much 
exposure to difference. Much attention is paid to the student who 
resists participation or who derides social justice pedagogy as 
biased and ideological. Considering the demographic situation in 
the United States of a largely White and middle- class corps of 
teacher education candidates, coupled with an increasingly diverse 
public school population and widespread poverty, the emphasis is 
understandable. Resistance to a pedagogical form is certainly a 
problem, and when resistance amounts to refusal to engage with 
difference, there are legitimate, considerable concerns for the 
professional preparedness of the student.
From at least two standpoints, however, an emphasis on 
students who are resistant to engaging with different perspectives 
may be problematic for an ethics for social justice teaching, and 
Hytten (2015) hints at these difficulties. From a pedagogical 
standpoint, if the modal student is one resistant to engaging in a 
pluralistic setting, students with broader experiences may not have 
their own learning needs met. From an ethical standpoint, this 
becomes a concern for equitable treatment— if the primary ethical 
concern is pushing resistant students too hard, the moral concern 
presupposes a particular kind of ethical self: one who must be 
convinced to act beyond one’s own self interest in order to be 
ethical. A closer look suggests that Hytten is moving away from 
these problematic limitations of teaching ethics. Much of what she 
is talking about is geared toward helping the previously nonreflec-
tive to become more reflective. At the same time, she is also 
concerned about students who enact violence in the classroom and 
who attempt to maintain subjugation of others through microag-
gressions. She briefly addresses the experiences of marginalized 
populations of students, and in her other work, there is broader 
focus to draw from.
As philosophers, we might explore in more depth the 
imagined students who participate in our classrooms. We might 
also explore our students’ habits of mind and the funds of knowl-
edge that students with varied backgrounds might bring to the 
classroom. An important philosophical question is this: What kind 
of learning context do we assume? Do we imagine that our 
classrooms are primarily places where nonreflective students 
practice being more reflective so that they may become more 
effective educators in a pluralistic society? Or do we imagine our 
classrooms as spaces where engagement between and among 
pluralistic discourses is enacted? I suspect that from her perspec-
tive, Hytten (2015) would argue that both of these imagined 
learning contexts are enacted at various times and are impossible 
to disentangle.
While the preparation of teachers and other early professionals 
is an important aspect of schools of education, reducing every 
philosophical discussion to that specific context runs the risk of 
drawing us away from the specific contexts of our own classrooms, 
including classrooms of midcareer professionals seeking higher 
levels of certification or engaging in scholarly pursuits. The contexts 
of these graduate- level classrooms bring their own unique chal-
lenges. While professional practice often makes these educators 
more reflective than their more novice counterparts, their experi-
ences and their reflections are quite varied. Often, particular 
experiences have led them to problematic conclusions about the 
populations with whom they have worked. A particular ethical 
challenge in these circumstances is how to challenge their taken- 
for- granted assumptions while respecting them as professionals— 
avoiding infantilizing them or ignoring their ethical positioning, for 
instance (Nash, 2002). As these seasoned professionals come into 
positions of increasing responsibility, the opportunities for them to 
enact social justice change can be quite profound. While much has 
been written about the moral agency of teachers over the years, 
much less attention has focused on the moral agency of school 
leaders. These leaders are in a position to create conditions in 
schools where teachers’ moral agency may flourish. In these 
contexts, we may find educators who have given up on innovative 
practice in favor of what they term to be realistic responses to the 
conditions under which they operate. Or we may encounter 
powerful professionals at midcareer who are overconfident in their 
abilities to engage in equity and social justice work. They may know 
well how to avoid controversy rather than how to engage it. Future 
scholars sometimes consider social justice a topic that holds no 
interest for them or that gets in the way of their pursuit of academic 
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careers. An ethics for social justice teaching might look different, 
then, in these different contexts. The social justice educator might 
not be focused so much on students with limited experiences with 
differences but instead be challenged to provide opportunities for 
students on opposite sides of life experiences to think differently 
about themselves in relation to each other (especially when the 
students in the class come from diverse ethnic, racial, and socioeco-
nomic backgrounds). A classroom of veteran educators, for 
instance, may be especially fruitful as a site of enacting deep 
democracy, if an ethics of mutual and professional respect is 
cultivated. A common ethical challenge at this level is taking 
students past polite conversation to a space characterized by 
deliberation (Piantanida & Garman, 2009), wherein students may 
productively challenge each other. An ethics for social justice 
pedagogy in this situation would ground the purposes for establish-
ing conditions of mutual respect. For instance, the instructor may 
cultivate mutual respect among students by modeling respectful 
responses to differences of opinion. An ethics might inform an 
instructor’s intervention in a moment of contentious misunder-
standing between two students or it may inform an instructor’s 
decision to acknowledge a microaggression. Hytten’s (2015) ethics 
addresses many of the same issues, but in different contexts, one 
aspect of the ethics may need more emphasis than others. Also, 
educational goals may be different. Flexible and adaptable ethics for 
the broad array of students we teach in schools of education would 
help us clarify our various educational goals in relation to social 
justice pedagogy and enact those goals with students at various 
places in their educational journeys.
Social Justice Teaching as Ethically Problematic
Much of the social justice literature that addresses ethics does so to 
justify, defend, or establish the value of social justice teaching. 
Hytten (2015) retraces the major arguments and at one point argues 
the necessity of a social justice position; her main reasons are the 
pervasiveness of injustice and how important education is in 
developing a more socially just society. She acknowledges that 
social justice pedagogy may carry a political bias and counters that 
such a critique assumes there is a neutral position from which 
teachers may work. She offers that a neutral position is implausible, 
and considering the evident social injustices in schools and society, 
a neutral position is a position that may unintentionally perpetuate 
injustice. Any pedagogy has political implications, and the 
challenge is to understand the politics with appropriate sophistica-
tion, and philosophical work can deepen our understanding of how 
politics and ethics interact.
Commentators on the subject have a hard time distinguishing 
political and ethical components of social justice pedagogy. 
Operating in this space, Hytten (2015) reframes the debate and 
makes the philosophical problems more precise. For Hytten, a social 
justice position by itself does not ethically justify any particular 
teaching practice enacted by a social justice educator. Hytten is 
convinced that bias is something that does indeed need to be 
critiqued, but unlike commentators such as Campbell, the bias she is 
referring to is not the position itself but the tendency to exercise an 
impositional stance. For Hytten, bias needs to be critiqued when it 
does harm to others and, she implies, if it is counterproductive to the 
struggle for social justice. Reading across Hytten’s article, I name 
several of her concerns and expand upon them.
First is the chief danger: conflating the moral justification of 
contending with issues of social justice and the ethics of teaching 
about it. In the extreme is the danger of grounding one’s practice in 
self- righteous indignation. Philosophically, this could take the 
form of a justification wherein the end justifies the means. An actor 
could use the principle of utility (or another consequentialist 
ethics) to argue that actions are justified if the consequences of the 
actions serve the greater good (Frankena, 1973). Besides the 
Kantian objection, wherein individuals are never to be treated as 
means to an end (e.g., Campbell, 2008, 2013), two additional 
critiques can be launched against this perspective.
A consequentialist perspective, requiring consideration of 
supposed ends for the choice of the most morally defensible action, 
is dependent upon the moral actor to imagine possible outcomes 
and to predict their likelihood. Following a teleological frame, an 
advocate for social justice would be expected to have a telos in 
mind that would ground pedagogical interactions. A Hegelian or 
Marxian teleology could certainly be imagined to ground 
pedagogy.
A second kind of critique can be imagined, one based in 
something like the concept of positionality. We should expect the 
consequences that one imagines for one’s pedagogy to be influ-
enced by positionality, one’s social and historical locations (Alcoff, 
1988; Milner, 2010). In practice, consequentialist ethics generally 
suffer from this serious limitation. One’s capacity to imagine the 
responses of others, particularly others with distinctly different 
positionalities than one’s own, is necessarily limited. In resolving an 
ethical dilemma, it is morally problematic to select the most 
morally defensible consequences from among the immediately 
imaginable ones. Consequentialist theory, most compelling when 
employed retrospectively, is not morally forgiving of the well- 
intended actor whose actions lead to unpleasant consequences. As 
such, it is also not terribly helpful to the practicing teacher, who is 
not likely to embrace the process of continually weighing possible 
consequences of his or her actions to make ethical decisions to 
inform teaching practice.
While, as I explain below, Hytten (2015) incorporates what she 
calls a utopian vision, she is not making a consequentialist argu-
ment. Her intended ends draw from a pragmatist moral sensibility 
that embraces neither Kantian nor consequentialist ethical frames. 
Since we can expect a pragmatist ethicist to place outcomes under 
careful scrutiny, it is not surprising that Hytten embraces deep 
democracy, suggestive of a critical process of moral engagement. 
Reading Campbell and Hytten in tandem makes it appear that the 
two authors are writing in different philosophical languages (Nash, 
2002). For her part, Campbell was concerned when social justice 
pedagogy becomes ideological, when teacher educators impose 
political views upon their students, and when in- service teachers 
are supposed to adopt and enact the politically partisan views of 
their instructors when they teach. Campbell saw social justice as at 
best a distraction to the cultivation of professional teachers. For 
her, teacher professionalism is itself grounded in the moral 
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responsibilities of the teacher, and teaching for social justice 
distracts from what she saw as the more defensible project of 
cultivating ethical teachers. Campbell can be read as establishing 
Kantian standards through which the problematics of social justice 
teaching (as ideally presented, in extreme, or in actual practice— 
it seems that Campbell has concerns about all three) make it 
impossible to resolve with a teaching ethics.
While Hytten (2015) is concerned with the project of ethical 
justification of social justice pedagogy, her substantive contribu-
tion moves beyond mere justification to seek an ethics of practice. 
Following Sockett (2009), she turns to virtues and cultivating 
habits. Following Valenzuela, she turns to an ethics of caring 
couched within a culturally responsive sensibility, wherein a 
educator’s intentions toward caring are placed within an interac-
tive, inquiry- oriented engagement with students’ needs and 
interests in caring. Taking these pragmatist and critical influences 
together, Hytten wants social justice educators to cultivate the 
habits of reflective humility, open- mindedness, and sympathetic 
attentiveness.
A remaining question is the philosophical place of her 
discussion of utopia. Throughout, Hytten (2015) names various 
value positions for social justice advocates. She argues for the value 
of pluralism and advocates transparency of values. She advocates 
for a vision of the world: “Diversity is prized, every student is 
valued, information is critiqued, and resources are distributed 
fairly” (p. 3). While the values are agreeable, it is important to note 
that not everyone will understand what it means to value them, 
and as with any list of values, it is vital for dialogue among mem-
bers of a community to determine what happens when various 
values come into conflict with each other. That is precisely the 
point for Hytten. Her vision for social justice is largely a living, 
practicing ethics— grounded in mutual respect and mutual 
engagement.
It makes sense that a philosophical argument grounded in 
pragmatist ethics would call upon a broad vision of advocacy. 
Valuing pluralism, for instance, could imply valuing varied visions 
and utopian ideals. For instance, any institution with multiple 
people committed to social justice will find their visions can come 
into ready conflict. Social justice visions need not only be 
expressed and enacted but also be made objects of inquiry. Within 
a pragmatist frame, creating the pedagogy enacts competing values 
in a social world through arrangements that embrace difference.
To go along with the pragmatist meta- ethics, in a particular 
institutional context, it would make sense for the vision of advo-
cacy to have an end- in- view. If the educational goal of social justice 
pedagogy is the creation of a more socially just world, fairly serious 
work needs to be done to figure out educational goals that are 
reasonable to accomplish within the confines of a higher education 
classroom. An institution might have a vision for social justice 
pedagogy that takes on an urban focus, for instance, mobilizing 
inquiry, pedagogy, and services that take the geographic context of 
urbanity seriously and centrally. The end- in- view could be more 
sophisticated knowledge and broader collaboration among 
multiple constituencies in order to build toward larger aims of 
equitable experiences for children in urban settings. In another 
context, the vision might be a focus on serving the needs and 
interests of children and adults of color, mobilizing those same 
efforts around culturally relevant and sustaining educational 
practices.
How Social Is a Social Justice Teaching Ethics?
A second philosophical concern implied in Hytten’s (2015) essay is 
how to balance an individual ethics with an institutional ethics and 
a larger social ethics. The teaching ethics discourse is largely 
individualistic and in that sense conventional in its application of 
ethical theory, owing to the traditions that the authors work in. 
Hytten has this to say about it: “What is sometimes lacking is 
critical reflection on the context in which teachers work, and the 
larger mission of schooling” (p. 6). Ethical frames that treat moral 
action solely as the province of the individual are of limited use in 
the face of structurally based social problems and power relations 
that work through actors without them being aware of it.
This individual/social concern comes out in Hytten’s (2015) 
engagement with Campbell’s arguments about the dangers associ-
ated with teachers’ moral agency that may become political activism. 
In her work on teacher professionalism, Campbell (2008, 2013) 
protected the role of the teacher as a moral agent and kept it separate 
from the political. This type of argument de- emphasizes the power 
that the teacher as moral agent may operate in promoting the social 
order or the ways in which education policy may change the power 
relations operating in schools (Biesta, 2004; Gunzenhauser, 2012). By 
separating ethics from politics, Campbell did not anticipate the ways 
in which power more generally intersects with ethics. For instance, 
the argument does not anticipate that political action may become 
necessary in order to defend or conserve the teacher’s place as a 
moral agent and moral actor.
Hytten (2015) is not likewise constrained. She works against a 
tendency of philosophers to slice ethics away from other philosophi-
cal concerns. The social justice classroom Hytten envisions is a site 
where deep democracy is enacted, and we get the sense that the 
process is a great deal of work. We could devote more discussion 
about the collaborative and collective nature of that work, which 
would help round out the ethics she imagines. Specifically, we may 
help teachers connect their ethical predispositions to sensitivity to 
collective action— starting with the individualized ethics and 
providing frameworks for educators to develop social ethics and 
plans for collective action.
Collective action may be a more reasonable and effective 
outcome, compared to the critical perspectives expressed in the 
social justice literature. As an empirical counterexample to 
Campbell’s concern, Hytten (2015) makes use of the systematic 
study by Cochran- Smith and her colleagues (2009) of student 
teachers educated in a social justice education program at Boston 
College. Rather than developing politically ideological teachers, 
the program fostered culturally sensitive and largely ethical 
teachers with a clear sense of service to and interest in the students 
with which they work. In this program at least, the students 
exhibited the kinds of moral positions that Campbell described as 
desirable in teachers without the sets of macro political commit-
ments that might be expected. Perhaps the commitment to practice 
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is of greater value than the specific macro political commitments, 
in addition to providing evidence that indoctrination does not 
appear to be the effect.
Enacting a Social Ethics
Hytten (2015) draws from Sockett’s (2009) argument of three 
virtues of teacher practice— character, intellect, and care— to name 
three accompanying habits that would contribute to a social justice 
teaching ethics. These three areas encourage space for dialogue 
about ethics in social justice teaching. I summarize these here and 
suggest two additional habits to round out Hytten’s ethics for social 
justice teaching.
Reflective humility is a habit for social justice educators to 
cultivate in themselves and in their students. Reflective humility 
builds character, an approach to ethics that Hytten (2015) 
embraces tentatively, considering her discomfort with the 
conservative nature of the character education discourse. For 
Hytten, reflective humility includes dialogue with diverse others. 
Social justice educators are encouraged to own their defensive-
ness and frustration. They should be open to challenges to their 
convictions, and they should engage in active listening. Educators 
should model convictions expressed with openness to difference 
and other beliefs.
Dewey appears in Hytten’s (2015) essay when she addresses the 
habit of open- mindedness. While she does not go in this particular 
direction, Hytten’s argument calls to mind psychological perspec-
tives on prejudice. We are not as likely to challenge ourselves, she 
argues, when we see something new. The social justice classroom that 
Hytten imagines is one in which participants learn from each other 
and the instructor is learning from the perspectives of students as 
well. Further directions that could be explored here include Garri-
son’s (1996) discussion of listening. We might also explore more 
explicitly developmental perspectives that may enable the social 
justice instructors to appreciate the psychological experience of their 
students, especially undergraduate students.
Hytten (2015) advocates a form of caring ethics reminiscent of 
Noddings (1984), played out in culturally responsive form in the 
work of Valenzuela (1999), with sympathetic attentiveness, wherein 
caring is offered by the one- caring and received and acknowledged 
by the cared- for. Sympathetic attentiveness demands the educator 
attempt to understand with generosity the views of others, especially 
when these views are different from the educator’s own. The instruc-
tor as the one- caring is nonjudgmental and nonaccusatory, there is 
recognition of human unfinishedness (Freire, 1970/1990), and the 
instructor operates under the assumption that others’ moral 
judgments are based upon good intentions (Nash, 2002). Sympa-
thetic attentiveness is a richly educational habit and one that could be 
developed conceptually in varied ethical frames.
Taken together, these habits go a long way toward ethically 
grounding the social justice classroom. Some complementary 
practices could be cultivated to address the aspects of collective 
action that Hytten (2015) values in her vision of social justice 
pedagogy. In the language of virtues and habits, we might refer to 
these additional contributors, described here as solidarity and 
comfort with discomfort, as communal habits. These habits and 
habits like them inform both teaching ethics and teaching practices 
and are largely implied in Hytten’s article.
Moving beyond individualistic ethical frames, a social justice 
educator may work to build solidarity among students in the 
classroom. If the emphasis in the classroom is largely on the 
majority- culture student without much experience of difference, 
then attending to social justice can place individual students in 
opposition to others. An individual ethics may actually encourage 
the opposition. In light of that possibility, some kind of ethics of 
solidarity might provide a counteracting force. Solidarity can be 
placed in contrast to consensus. Solidarity implies not that every-
one is in agreement on an idea or belief but that various people 
agree on an action that will be undertaken (and reflected upon) 
together (Welch, 2000). For instance, teacher education students in 
a field experience course might agree to all work together to learn 
from each other’s experiences encountering children of varied 
backgrounds in their classrooms. Additionally, to build solidarity 
through material interaction, they might agree to work together on 
a service- learning project. Solidarity can also emerge more 
modestly through the creation of a communal space. Hytten (2015) 
characterizes just such a communal space within the values and 
vision she names for the classroom.
Hytten (2015) notes that the communal space of the social 
justice classroom need not be guaranteed to be “safe” to the extent 
that no one is challenged to think differently. Leading students into 
discomfort is challenging, and as Hytten notes, some social justice 
pedagogues argue that crisis is an essential prerequisite for learn-
ing. While the reliance on stage theory and the necessity of 
psychological crisis can certainly be overdone and can lead to 
unnecessarily standardizing the development trajectories of 
students, it is problematic to assume that keeping everyone safe and 
comfortable in the classroom will lead to such important educa-
tional goals as learning from difference. Clarity on educational 
goals certainly helps in this case; for example, in teacher prepara-
tion programs, students may express discomfort with participating 
in field experiences in areas of their communities in which they 
have little experience. That discomfort is not something that the 
social justice educator can control, but neither should it be ignored. 
It should instead be acknowledged and engaged. Instructors, in 
other words, need to cultivate a comfort with discomfort and 
develop practices that make discomfort productive.
Hytten’s (2015) essay is provocative and productive of mean-
ingful philosophical conversation about the ethics of social justice 
teaching. Arguing from critical and pragmatist sensibilities, she 
suggests vital habits to nurture our character, intellect, and caring. 
Additional attention to cultivating communal habits, I argue, 
would extend her project in meaningful and consistent ways.
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